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UNITED STATES REGULATION OF FOREIGN
AIRLINES COMPETITION
By NICHOLAS N. KixrRIEt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE forces of increasing international air travel competition have re-
cently turned the Civil Aeronautics Board, the District of Columbia
courts and Congress' into an arena wherein a fierce struggle is taking place
between liberalism and restrictionism. Recently filing a complaint seeking
an injunction against the Civil Aeronautics Board, in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, a group of major foreign
airlines launched their attack on the Board's authority to regulate the
schedules and capacities of foreign airlines doing business in the United
States
Specifically, it was the purpose of the complaint to restrain the CAB
from adopting a regulation, and submitting it to the President for ap-
proval, under which foreign airlines would be required to file traffic data
with the CAB and also submit their schedules to the Board for approval.
Under this proposed regulation the CAB would have the authority to
disapprove any schedule filed with it upon giving the foreign airlines
twenty days notice!
While the complaint, on its face, primarily challenged the power of
the CAB, under the authority granted it by Congress, to require flight
statistics and to control the schedules of foreign airlines, the vital issue
behind it concerned the means that may be employed by the United States
Government for the purpose of restraining undesirable competitive eco-
nomic activities of such airlines. For students of constitutional law the
controversy also raised again the long-debated question as to the validity
of a Congressional authorization, and an administrative regulation pro-
posed in pursuance thereof, in the face of a conflicting commitment made
by the United States Government in an executive agreement with a for-
eign country. Claiming lack of authority on the part of the CAB to
inquire into schedule and capacity questions, the foreign airlines stressed
that their operations in the United States were under a mandate derived
from the terms of several bilateral agreements between the United States
and their respective governments under which no country was to exercise
t Attorney, Washington, D.C. Formerly Counsel to U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
committee (1959-1962); Project Director, American Bar Foundation (1956-1958). LL.B., M.A.,
University of Kansas, 1951; Raymond Fellow, University of Chicago, 1955; LL.M., Georgetown,
1963.
1 See S. 2834 introduced in the 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) at the request of the Air Transport
Association of America, which would amend the Federal Aviation Act to expressly authorize the
CAB to control the volume of service provided by foreign air carriers.
"BOAC v. Boyd, C.A. 3315-62; U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C. Similar action was instituted in 1961,
see BOAC v. CAB, 304 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
3CAB Order No. E-16288 (Jan. 18, 1961).
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any schedule or capacity controls whatsoever over the airlines of the
other.' Overriding these specific legal issues is the political question of
whether the tools to be employed for the resolution of conflicts concerning
aviation between this and foreign governments should consist primarily
of judicial tribunals, arbitration, diplomatic negotiations or administrative
controls.
The history of international aviation in the United States since the end
of World War II clearly illustrates that in the past foreign airlines were
permitted to operate freely under their own uncensored schedules. Indeed,
not only the airlines of countries which have bilateral agreements to that
effect with the United States benefit from this lack of controls, but also
the other airlines are permitted the same freedom.' At the present time
there are sixty-eight foreign airlines flying to and out of the United States,
and twenty-three United States flag carriers are authorized to engage in
international operations to sixty-six foreign countries. These foreign air-
lines have previously been subject to United States supervision only for
safety and other mechanical or administrative controls. No supervision was
exercised by the United States over the economic phase of the operations
such as the number of weekly flights and the type and capacity of the
equipment used.
Traditionally, it was the opinion of the United States Government that
freedom of competition in international aviation was the most stimulating
and beneficial system for the overall development of the industry. Fur-
thermore, it was the position of the American Government that artificial
national restraints on the operation of airlines would be contrary to our
own American interests, and that the scope of foreign airlines operations
anywhere in the world should be determined, therefore, by the laws of
supply and demand. Recently, the pressure of American carriers pro-
testing the expanded operation of foreign airlines has apparently tended
to produce a change in the United States' position. The additional com-
plaint has been heard that several other countries have failed to afford
equal and fair treatment to American carriers and indeed have subjected
them to schedule supervision, and that only through similar retaliatory
measures may we succeed in reversing or modifying the positions of the
foreign nations.
This is a mere sketch of the background of the present controversy.
Yet in light of America's past aviation policy, and in the face of recent
reassertions of our faith in the freedom of aviation,' there is great interest
in this recent attempt to change the United States' position, especially be-
cause the institution of the new control system is being attempted through
a unilateral administrative regulation, rather than through a mutually
agreed modification of the bilateral agreements under which the present
freedom of operation is recognized.
4 For a prototype of these agreements see Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America relating to Air Services, concluded
February 11, 1946 (60 Stat. 1499).
5 CAB, Docket 12063, Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner, p. 13 (June 21, 1962).
(I am indebted to Hearing Examiner Edward T. Stodola for the opportunity to discuss with him
the background of his Recommended Decision.)
' See position of United States delegation at Third Regional Conference of Civil Aviation at
Bogota, Colombia, in Feb. 1962, III CRAC-40, CEC-09 - Eng. (Feb. 7, 1962).
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II. THE BILATERAL AVIATION AGREEMENTS
Of the bilateral agreements providing for the freedom of aviation the
earliest and the one which has served as a prototype for all others is the
1946 Bermuda Agreement under which the British Overseas Airways
Corporation, The British West Indian Airways, and the Bahamas Airways
operate in this country. The resolution which preceded this agreement,
concluded between the British and the United States Governments at
Bermuda on February 11, 1946,' expresses the determination of the two
governments '"to foster and encourage the widest possible distribution of
the benefits of air travel for the general good of mankind at the cheapest
rate consistent with sound economic principles."' The resolution proceeds
to state that it is the understanding of both governments that service pro-
vided by designated air carriers under the agreement "shall retain as their
primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic de-
mands between the country of which such air carrier is a national and
the country of ultimate destination of the traffic."'
The agreement proper does not deal specifically with the question of
schedule and capacity controls. Article 2 of the Agreement states that:
The designated air carrier or carriers may be required to satisfy the aero-
nautical authorities of the Contracting Parties granting the rights that it
or they is or are qualified to fulfill the conditions prescribed by or under
the laws and regulations normally applied by those authorities to the opera-
tions of commercial air carriers.
Article 8 of the Agreement states that:
Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement or its Annex, if either of
the Contracting Parties considers it desirable to modify the terms of the
Annex to this Agreement, it may request consultation between the aero-
nautical authorities of both Contracting Parties .... [W]hen these authori-
ties agree on modification to the Annex, these modifications will come into
effect when they have been confirmed by an Exchange of Notes through the
diplomatic channel.
The Agreement provides further, in Article 9, that any dispute between
the contracting parties relating to the interpretation or application of the
Agreement which cannot be settled through such consultation is to be
referred for an advisory report to the Interim Council of the Provisional
International Civil Aviation Organization. Finally, the Agreement pro-
vides in Article 13, that each contracting party may request consultation
with the other party in order to initiate amendments to the Agreement,
and that pending the outcome of such consultation either party may give
notice to the other of its desire to terminate the agreement, which termi-
nation is to become effective twelve months after the date of notice.
Although the body of the Agreement nowhere specifically exempts
schedule and capacity controls from the national jurisdiction, this exemp-
tion has been officially recognized by the United States Government. In-
deed, it was apparently the American Government which initially pressed
for such exemptions and it was considered a great achievement for the
7 60 Stat. 1499.
sPara. (1) of Resolution.
'Para. (6) of Resolution.
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American delegation to the Bermuda Conference that such controls were
not incorporated in the agreement.
The position of the United States at Bermuda is clearly attested to by
testimony before the Commerce Committee of the United States Senate."
In the testimonies of George P. Baker, Chairman of the United States
Delegation, and L. Welch Pogue, a member of the Delegation, it appears
that complete freedom with regard to schedules and capacity was the
American aim and accomplishment.
Pertinent excerpts from the transcript read as follows:
Mr. Baker . . . it was agreed that there should be no control such as there
had been very strongly enforced up to this date on the frequency of
operation ...
The Chairman. That means that the British may send planes here as fre-
quently as they choose and we may send them there. (Hearings, Page 27).
Mr. Pogue. The first point I want to mention about the unlimited schedules
is that it is true that this Agreement provides no conrol over frequencies,
and that was basically our position .... (Hearings, Page 40).
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, although desiring to control fre-
quencies as well, agreed to modify its position in this regard so that the
Agreement has no limitation upon frequencies and permits each nation to
determine for itself the number of frequencies which its own air carriers
shall operate. (Hearings, Page 45).
We are most anxious to have the full right to run such frequencies as our
traffic justifies because Americans have a tendency to travel much more
extensively than many other peoples and further because of the probability
that all frequency limitation agreements would ensure to each government
50% of the schedules permitted. This would force many travellers to ride
on certain airplanes regardless of their desires-a result contrary to sound
principle .... [a]ll these and other important objectives which are important
to the United States have been achieved in this bilateral Agreement ...
(Hearings, Pages 48-49).
Senator McClellan: Mr. Pogue . ..Now is there any control or is there
anything involved in this Agreement with respect to the control of capacity,
the number of passengers that may be carried in any one ship?
Mr. Pogue. No Senator, we are very careful to avoid that like the plague,
so to speak, because when it comes to control and capacity, as an alternative
for controlling schedules, we feel that it is subject to much more serious
evils. . . . (Hearings, Page 55).
The consensus of the Agreement reached at Bermuda was expressed also
in a joint statement issued simultaneously by both governments on Sep-
tember 19, 1946, which declared: "[b]oth parties believe that in regu-
lating any new bilateral agreements with other countries, they should
follow the basic principles agreed at Bermuda including particularly ...
the elimination of formulae for the predetermination of frequencies or
capacity or of any arbitrary division of air traffic between countries and
or national airlines."
" Hearings on S. 1814 before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1946).
" State Dep't Press Release No. 660 (Sept. 19, 1946).
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Bilateral agreements, substantially similar to the Bermuda Agreement,
have subsequently been entered into between the United States and forty-
seven other countries. Under the authority of these agreements airlines
designated by the various foreign governments have been coming to the
United States. Some twenty additional foreign airlines also operate in the
United States on the basis of reciprocal special permits, without the
benefit of bilateral agreements.
III. INCREASING THE CAB REGULATORY POWERS
When operating in this country, foreign airlines are not completely
free of United States administrative controls. The Civil Aeronautics Board
is vested, under Section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958," with
the power to issue permits to foreign air carriers before they may com-
mence operations. The Act authorizes the Board to "prescribe the dura-
tion of any permit" and to "attach to such permit such reasonable terms,
conditions, or limitations as, in its judgment, the public interest may
require.""
Section 1102 of the Federal Aviation Act qualifies, however, the power
of the Board by providing that: "In exercising and performing their
powers and duties under this Act, the Board and administrators shall do
so consistently with any obligation assumed by the United States in any
treaty, convention, or agreement that may be enforced between the United
States and any foreign country." The exercise of the Civil Aeronautics
Board's authority to issue foreign air carrier permits must therefore fit
within the confines of both of these sections.
In the past those permits merely specified the areas to be served by
the foreign carrier, reasserted the requirement of airworthiness and pro-
vided, finally, that the permits were to remain in effect until the termina-
tion of the treaty, convention, or agreement under the provisions of which
the foreign carrier was operating.
After some fifteen years of this tradition, the CAB on January 18,
1961, introduced the proposal for a departure from the traditional non-
interference policy with regard to the economic operations of the foreign
airlines." The exercise of the new economic controls was to take place
through an amendment of the permits issued to foreign air carriers, under
which modification the CAB could require the submission to the Board
of traffic data and also of existing and future schedules for approval.
Admittedly, the purpose of this amendment is to establish a machinery in
the Board for the possible imposition of capacity and frequency limita-
tions on the operation of foreign airlines.
Since Section 402 (f) of the Federal Aviation Act provides that "any
permit" may be modified or amended if, after notice and hearing, it is
found that such action would be in the public interest," the Board order-
ed a public hearing on the proposed amendment. Notice of the proposed
permit changes was also given to the President, in accord with Section 801
of the Federal Aviation Act which provides that "the issuance, denial,
transfer, amendment, cancellation, suspension or revocation of, and the
1249 U.S.C., § 1301 et seq.
'a Section 402(e); 49 U.S.C. S 1372(e).
14 CAB, Order No. E-16288 (January 18, 1961).
'549 U.S.C. 5 1372.
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terms, conditions, and limitations contained in any ...permit issuable to
any foreign air carrier under Section 402 of this Act shall be subject to
the approval of the President. Copies of all applications in respect to such
certificates and permits shall be transmitted to the President by the Board
before hearing thereon, and all decisions thereon by the Board shall be
submitted to the President before publication thereof.""6
On June 1, 1961, BOAC and other foreign companies including SAS,
KLM and Sabena moved the CAB to dismiss them from this proceeding,
on the ground that the Board lacked the power to amend their foreign
air carrier permits in the manner proposed. It was the allegation of the
airlines that the Bermuda Agreement does not permit either party to con-
trol the capacity or frequency of service offered by the carriers of the
other party and that Section 1102 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
requires the Board to act consistently with the Bermuda Agreement and
other applicable bilaterals. This motion was denied by the CAB on July
27, 1961.7
Refusing to reconsider the denial of the petitioner's request, the Board
stated:
In spite of the necessary concomitants of national air space sovereignty
and even though Section 402 is clear in its provisions regarding our authority
to attach terms and conditions to foreign air carrier permits, it is urged
that because of the provisions of outstanding bilateral air transport agree-
ments to which the United States is party, Section 1102 limits our authority
to act under Section 402 of the Act with respect to the permits of those
foreign air carriers whose countries are also parties to such agreement. How-
ever, there is no express provision in Section 1102 that the Board shall
disregard any other express authority or prohibition of the Act .... [I]t is
clear that the provisions of Section 1102 do not abandon our national air space
sovereignty, especially when viewed in conjunction with the outstanding
international agreements to which Section 1102 alludes. Further, there is
nothing in the international agreements that deprives the Board of the right
to perform its functions under Section 402 of the Act."8
BOAC, joined by a group of major foreign airlines, then petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to
review the CAB orders denying their request. The Board moved the Court
to dismiss the petition for review on the ground that no final order con-
cerning the amendment of the foreign carrier permits had been issued and
that, furthermore, this matter was not within the reviewing jurisdiction
of the Court because of Section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958. This Section provides that "(a) Any order, affirmative or negative,
issued by the Board or Administrator under this Act, except any order in
respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the President
as provided in Section 801 of this Act, shall be subject to review by the
Courts of Appeals of the United States ... upon petition, filed within 60
days after the entry of such order.""6
On July 19, 1962, the Court of Appeals denied the petition on the
ground that under Section 1006 it lacked jurisdiction to review orders of
1649 U.S.C. § 1461.
17 Order No. E-17235.
18 Order E-17537.
1649 U.S.C. § 1486(a).
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the CAB concerning foreign airlines. The Court further held that this
determination was without prejudice to the airlines' right to proceed in
the District Court, "if and when" the regulation was promulgated."0
During the pendency of the airlines' petition for injunction before the
Court of Appeals, the companies also appeared at the hearings held before
the Board's hearing examiner during the period of December 5, 1961,
to January 12, 1962. Although reserving their rights to challenge the
Board's jurisdiction and power to effectuate the amendment, the com-
panies nevertheless filed briefs and participated fully in the hearings before
the Board. On June 21, 1962, the hearing examiner's recommended de-
cision was entered, recommending against the adoption of the proposed
regulation and the proposed permit amendments. Oral arguments before
the Board in opposition and in support of the hearing examiner's recom-
mended decision were held on October 24, 1962. With this the public
process comes to an end, and it became the function of the Board to make
a final determination whether or not to adopt the proposed amendments
and to advise the President of their decision.
Still fearing an adverse decision by the CAB, the airlines again proceeded
to ask for judicial relief. Appearing before the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, the airlines moved for a summary judgment
declaring that the Civil Aeronautics Board is without statutory power
and authority to make the proposed amendment in the foreign air carrier
permits, and further requested that an order be entered to restrain the
CAB from transmitting to the President any decision or order affecting
or recommending such amendment."
The Government again objected to the request of the foreign airlines.
The request of the foreign airlines, the Government argued, is premature
until such time as the regulation has actually been promulgated. Because
the final decision as to whether the foreign air carrier permits will in fact
be amended is a matter committed to the President and he may take
action different from that of the Board, the Government argued that
judicial intervention at this time would constitute an unauthorized restraint
upon the President in the discharge of his Constitutional and statutory
responsibilities. The CAB went on to state that the proposed regulation
would be within its statutory authority if adopted, but conceded that the
airlines could 'nevertheless challenge any such regulation upon adoption
as ultra vires provided that there is a proper showing at that time of its
adverse impact upon the airlines. The Government concluded by stressing
that since the question as to what action will ultimately be taken by the
United States is wholly speculative, there was no justiciable controversy
existing at the time. In a decision entered on January 9, 1963, Judge
Burnita Matthews rejected the motion of the foreign carriers and dis-
missed the complaint.
IV. BACKGROUND OF THE NEW CAB POSITION
The ruling had the effect of postponing the decision on whether grant-
ing the CAB the power requested by it would violate the Federal law and
the applicable bilateral international agreements, until such time as the re-
quired action by the president might officially approve the grant of this
'0 BOAC v. CAB, 304 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir., 1962).
"1BOAC v. Boyd, C.A. 3315-62, U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.
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regulatory power to the CAB. Instead of awaiting such development, the
foreign airlines may decide to take an appeal from the decision of the
District Court to the higher courts. But while the decision as to what pro-
cedural strategy would best serve the interests of the foreign carriers is
still pending, a review of the reversal by the United States Government of
the position originally taken by it at Bermuda, may be of interest not
only to practitioners of international trade, but also to students of inter-
national law. Indeed, while there is no clear evidence available to indicate
that the proposed amendment to the foreign carrier permits has been
blessed by the Administration it is unlikely that the CAB would have
gone this far without some preliminary clearance with the Department
of State or the White House.
The actual reasons for the CAB's reversal of position are almost lost in
an obscure portion of the Board's brief before the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Says the CAB:
[I]f plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that a condition in the area
here involved is in conflict with the bilaterals, it would seem that other
nations would recognize and give to the agreements the interpretation for
which plaintiffs contend. Other nations do not, and the actual practices
indicate that the reservation proposed by the Board does not conflict with
the bilaterals. Indeed, the plaintiff's Scandinavian Airline System (SAS)
is in the position of asserting that the United States is precluded from sub-
jecting it to the same type of requirement which its governments imposed
on our carriers .... Further, the examiner found . . . that there are at least
24 nations with which this country has Bermuda-type agreements which
require our carriers to file their schedules and which assert a power to dis-
approve them.22
The competitive position of the American flag carriers vis-a-vis the
foreign airlines has been a subject of great concern in recent years. Having
originally pleaded for complete economic laissez faire on the hope that
the forces of supply and demand would enure to the benefit of the United
States lines, our domestic carriers have been finding the competition of
the revitalized foreign carriers much too hard to meet. Statistics show that
despite a growth in the absolute number of passengers carried, the share
of the United States flag air carriers in the international air travel to and
from the United States has been waning. In the period between 1957 and
1960 the passenger traffic of foreign-flag carriers in the United States
international market increased by eighty-one percent, while the increase
of the U.S. flag carriers was a mere thirty-one percent. Consequently, the
percentage of the U.S. flag carriers in the total United States international
air travel market fell from 62.6 percent in 1957 to 54.7 percent in 1960,
2 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
for Summary Judgment, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia at 14, C.A. 3315-62. It is
indeed the position of the CAB that the adoption of the proposed regulation is not intended to
establish an overall system of schedules and capacities controls over foreign airlines. The CAB
asserts that the great number of departures from the Bermuda principles by other countries puts
the United States at a disadvantage and that such departures may continue and increase in number
unless the United States asserts the power to retaliate. The power to regulate the schedules of
foreign-flag carriers is therefore looked upon as a weapon to compel the compliance of other coun-
tries with the Bermuda principles. (I am indebted to Mr. J. C. Watson, Director of the Bureau of
International Affairs of the CAB for a personal opportunity to discuss the problems that the
CAB is facing in this area.)
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while the foreign carriers share went up from 37.4 percent to 45.3 per-
cent of the market."
Searching for culprits, the American airlines have been inclined to
blame unfair practices by foreign carriers and undue restraints by foreign
nations. While the freedom of air traffic under the bilateral agreements
was founded on the general assumption that each international air carrier
would be primarily designed to meet the travel needs between its own
country and the country of final destination, 4 some European and Latin
American carriers have apparently found such popular response as to
give them a share of the market beyond that attributable to their own
national traffic. (This applies particularly to the so-called Fifth and Sixth
Freedom traffic encompassing travellers picked up by a contracting carrier
in a foreign country other than the country of the carrier's origin and set
down in the country of another contracting party, and vice versa.) Com-
plaints have also been heard that restrictive schedule controls by some
countries have made it difficult for U.S. carriers to develop profitable over-
seas markets. On the other hand, recognition must be given to the fact
that air travel is very much a "service" rather than a "commodity" busi-
ness and in being so it suffers from some of the competitive disadvantages
typical to American "service" businesses. Attention must also be given
to the fact that recent years saw a greater percentage increase in alien
over United States citizen travel to and from the U.S., and the increased
foreign carrier share in the market may be attributable to the alien
travellers' preference for their own national airlines."
It is in light of these developments that the proposed action by the
CAB to regulate foreign carrier schedules must be viewed. The opposition
to unilateral United States attempts to remedy the situation stems not
only from the foreign carriers but also from several foreign governments.
The government of Great Britain, in a note delivered to the United States
Government, protested the proposed action." The foreign airlines predicate
their opposition on the premise that the number of flights operated and
the types of equipment utilized by foreign air carriers are matters wholly
beyond the purview of the Federal Aviation Act and that, therefore, if
the economic operations are to become subject to any control at all this
must be accomplished through diplomatic channels or arbitration as
specified in the applicable international agreements. In sum, the conclusion
is invited that the operation of foreign carriers is within the bounds of
"foreign commerce" over which Congress has primary jurisdiction under
the Constitution and that Congress did not confer sufficient authority on
the Board or even the President to cope with the actualities of foreign
operations in this area.
The CAB alleges, on the other hand, that the concept that each nation
has sovereignty over its own air space is a generally accepted one, being
also specifically recognized in Section 1108 of the Federal Aviation Act,28
and that:
23 CAB, Docket 12063, Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner (June 21, 1962).
24 See Bermuda Agreement, 60 Star. 1499 at para. (6) of Resolution.
25 CAB, Docket 12063, Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner, p. 40, 41 (June 21, 1962).
2
'The Note, dated May 16, 1961, was not made public.
27 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, clause 3: "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ... "
2849 U.S.C. § 1508.
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As a matter of legal theory, therefore, foreigners conduct operations to this
country on our terms, just as our operations to their countries are conducted
on theirs. True, concessions may be made on both sides so that operations
can be -conducted, but that does not alter the fact that this Nation has
power, if it wishes to exercise it, to exclude foreign carriers altogether, or
to impose such conditions as it sees fit on their entry.2"
The Board points out in this connection that pursuant to Section 402 (f)
of the Federal Aviation Act" it is empowered, after observing the pro-
cedures specified therein and upon the concurrence of the President, to
terminate a foreign air carrier permit for any "public interest" reason and
that "it would be strange indeed if the lesser power were absent to impose
conditions designed to ensure reciprocity of treatment or adherence to the
terms on which the initial entry was permitted, and we submit that the
Congress did not withhold such powers."31 (It is important to note that
this exact language of the statute granting the Board its termination au-
thority dates back to the original 1938 legislation establishing the Board
and therefore precedes the signing of the bilateral agreements.32 The CAB
finally rests its claim for specific authority to control schedules upon Sec-
tion 402 (e) of the Federal Aviation Act,3 again dating back to 1938 and
prior to the signing of the bilateral agreements, which authorizes the
Board, subject to the approval of the President, to attach to a foreign air
carrier permit "such reasonable terms, conditions, or limitations as, in its
judgment, the public interest may require."
The Civil Aeronautics Board has consistently held to the view, which
it now seeks to test, that Section 1102, requiring adherence with the pro-
visions of treaties and other international agreements, or for that matter
the bilateral agreements themselves, do not limit or supplant Section 402,
which grants the Board the general power to protect the "public interest."
Making this assertion, the CAB indeed touches upon a much broader legal
question which has been subject to debate by constitutional law com-
mentators for several years and which concerns the binding power of
executive agreements. The sum total of the CAB argument is, in fact, that
the bilateral aviation agreements lack the force to override the statute
granting the CAB its authority. The Board's position thus raises not
merely the general question as to whether or not an executive agreement
has the force of a treaty with the consequence, among others, of over-
riding a statute, 4 but also a host of narrower technical questions. (1)
2' See Memorandum of Points, supra note 22.
3049 U.S.C. § 1372(f).
31 See Memorandum of Points, supra note 22.
3" See 1958 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 3741. Civil Aeronautics Act of June 23, 1938,
52 Stat. 973.
"a49 U.S.C. § 1372(e).
" For detailed discussions of this question, and favoring the supremacy of executive agreements,
see Lissytzyn, Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transportation, 17 J. Air L. & Com.
436 (1950). In his article Professor Lissytzyn in fact forecasts a situation similar to the one in-
volved in this case and asserts the supremacy of the executive agreement. Says Lissytzyn:
"Section 1102 is a limitation on the powers of the Board under Section 402.
If there is an obligation to issue a permit to a designated foreign air carrier, failure
to do so would be a violation of the Board's statutory duty, even if the record,
apart from the international agreement, would require a finding that the proposed
service is not in the public interest."
Id. at 450. On the affirmative see, also Matthews, Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude
International Agreements, 64 Yale L.J. 345, 370, 389 (1955). For the opposite view see United
States v. Capps, 204 F.2d 655 (1953); Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 40 Am.
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Is the fact that the bilateral agreements were entered subsequent to the
original statutory grant of authority to the Board sufficient to override
the statutory language? (2) Must an executive agreement specifically
override a statute in order to become supreme authority? (3) What was
the effect of the Congressional reenactment of the Board's authority at a
time subsequent to the time of the bilateral agreements?
Although asserting full powers over foreign carriers in spite of the
bilateral agreements, the CAB has nevertheless claimed its willingness to
modify and limit its controls in the immediate case only to situations where
no bilateral agreement was in effect or else to situations where the Board
would specifically wish to act notwithstanding the existence of a bilateral
agreement. "Such situations would arise where a foreign country had taken
restrictive action against United States' carriers, where consultations had
failed to resolve a problem of excessive capacity, or where the action the
Board would take would be to carry out the termination of an arbitration
award under the terms of a bilateral.""
The foreign airlines make the final argument that the proposed new
amendment would enable the CAB to regulate, through the power of dis-
approval, the schedules and equipment of foreign air carriers on a con-
tinuing day-to-day basis. Say the foreign air carriers:
The planning of schedules and utilization of equipment is one of the most
vital functions of an airline's management. In seeking to substitute its
judgment in this field for that of management the Board is asserting a most
sweeping regulatory jurisdiction over foreign air carriers. Indeed, it seeks
the power of life and death over their business.'0 In conclusion the foreign
carriers state: [T]he complaint herein shows the extent of plaintiffs' in-
vestment in their United States business. The Board seeks the power to
place this investment in serious jeopardy. . . . [I]n essence, the proposed
[regulation] represents an unlawful intrusion by the Board into the field of
foreign affairs, which is reserved to the President."
V. CONCLUSIONS
The powers that the CAB is seeking are extensive indeed and do not
consist merely of clear cut administrative responsibilities. The hearing
examiner appointed by the CAB in this case correctly observed that pre-
sumably the Board would use the powerful weapon of schedule approval or
disapproval as a sort of bargaining tool in those situations where it thought
our flag carriers were unfairly treated by foreign governments or where
the carriers of other foreign governments violated the capacity clauses of
existing bilaterals. In either case, a full power of retaliation against foreign
air carriers would be lodged with the Board." Basing their argument on
this finding of the examiner the foreign airlines concluded that:
Pol. Sci. Rev. 729, 733 (1946); Comment, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?
53 Yale L.J. 664 (1944) ; Comment, The St. Lawrence Waterway and Power Project, 43 Am. J. Int'l
L. 411, 429 (1949); See also, Simpson, Legal Aspects of Executive Agreements, 24 Iowa L. Rev.
67 (1938), and McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 Minn. L.
Rev. 709, 767 (1958).
"Statement of Material Facts" submitted by the CAB in the case of BOAC v. Boyd, C.A.
3315-62, U.S. Dist. Court for D.C.
' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary
Judgment and for a Preliminary Injunction, p. 12.
.
7 id. at 15, 16.
38 CAB, Docket 12063, Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner, p. 65 (June 21, 1962).
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[B]argaining with foreign governments and retaliating against their citizens
is not one of the functions of the Board or, for that matter, of any Federal
administrative agency. These matters are at the core of the conduct of
United States foreign policy, which is "the very delicate, plenary power of
the President as the sole organ of the Federal Government in the field of
international relations. 39
But regardless of whether this power can be delegated to the Board, it is
obvious that no clear expression of the Presidential or Congressional in-
tent to make such delegation has hitherto been made.
One additional argument has been advanced, to the effect that the
proposed regulation is objectionable because it would discriminate against
the foreign carriers in favor of local carriers. Since the proposed CAB
power to approve or disapprove schedules would not apply to any United
States flag carriers, the schedules and equipment of such carriers will not
be subject to the Board's controls and will remain unrestricted. This, the
foreign airlines argue, would result in this discriminatory treatment in
violation of the guarantees of equal opportunity obtained in the bilateral
agreements." The argument, indeed, touches also on the question whether
the proposed amendment would accord the foreign carriers less than thetcnational" treatment, as guaranteed to foreign companies by the Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties between this and the other coun-
tries involved.4
Unless the CAB withdraws the proposed regulation of foreign carrier
schedules or else the President so decrees, it remains possible that the resolu-
tion of the issues and questions contained in this conflict may take place in
the courts of law of the United States. Yet the fact remains that the basic
problems involved in this case are not merely legal. Assuming that the
mere enactment of the proposed regulation would not constitute a viola-
tion of the international obligation of the United States under the bi-
lateral agreements until after the powers claimed for the CAB under the
regulation are actually exercised, and even conceding that the bi-lateral
agreements were not intended to sanction the indiscriminate expansion of
the Fifth and Sixth Freedom traffic and, indeed, possibly envisioned "ex
post facto" adjustments between the parties-the question still remains
as to the political advisability of the manner by which the CAB proposes
to proceed.4 It is clear that the issues involved in the extension of the
CAB's economic regulatory powers may have a direct bearing not only on
the obligations of the United States under international treaties, but also
upon the foreign relations of this country and the development of retalia-
tory economic restrictionist movements abroad. It is regrettable therefore
that the CAB, with or without the blessings of other parts of the Adminis-
tration, took it upon itself to make such radical changes in a traditional
United States position through unilateral action.
"gMemorandum of Plaintiffs at 17, quoting the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
" See, Bermuda Agreement, 60 Stat. 1499, para. (4) of Resolution.
"' See, for example, Article VII, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty with Japan,
April 2, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. 4 U.S.T. 2066. Transportation is usually exempted, however,
from the requirement of national treatment.
42I am indebted to Professor Stanley D. Metzger of the Georgetown Law Center for the op-
portunity to read his paper on "Bilateral System of Exchanging Traffic Rights" (unpublished)
which deals with this general problem. The views expressed above are not those of Professor Metzger.
CAB REGULATION
It is uncertain whether or not the decreasing share of U.S. flag carriers
in the international air travel market is merely a temporary phenomenon
and, in any event, whether the relative decrease bears any important
consequences. A highly qualified commentator recently observed that:
Preoccupation with the share of U.S. flag air carriers in world air transport
activities-or, more commonly, with their share in passenger travel to and
from the United States-serves to divert much needed attention from the
problem of assuring a healthy over-all rate of growth of world air transport.
Yet without such growth the optimum development of the United States air
transport industry is not likely to become a reality.43
Regardless of whether this view is generally accepted, the tools proposed
to be used by the CAB to remedy the evil are not merely improper in terms
of our international obligations and the management of our foreign re-
lations, but are also inadequate in terms of effective administrative process.
Testimony before the Commission has demonstrated that only a very
small number of foreign air carriers are responsible for the situation which
the CAB seeks to cure." Most of the offenders are carriers which operate
in this country without benefit of bilateral agreements but are admitted,
instead, under reciprocal operating permits. In the latter case, the operating
permits can be modified to meet specific new conditions without the
necessity of an overall reversal of the position endorsed in some forty-eight
bilateral agreements. For the resolution of problems produced by carriers
operating under bilateral agreements, full advantage should first be taken
of the remedial avenues set up under the agreements and only as a last
resort, and upon full consultation with Congress and the White House,
should the drastic tool of unilateral controls be exercised.
"' Lissitzyn, The Participation of the United States in World Air Transport: Statistics and the
National Interest, 28 J. Air L. and Com. 1, 15 (1962).
"CAB, Docket 12063, Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner, p. 49-51 (June 21, 1962).
